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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

NOTES

ODD MAN OUT: POLITICAL DEBATES AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AFTER ARKANSAS EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION
COMMISSION V. FORBES

The question of political viability is, indeed, so subjective, so arguable, so
susceptible of variation in individual opinion, as to provide no secure basis for
the exercise of governmental power consistent with the First Amendment.1

I. INTRODUCTION
One of our nation’s fundamental principles is the right to speak freely and
express oneself without fear of retribution.2 This right is essential to a
successful democratic society.3 It became part of our Constitution in 1771 as
the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights.4

1. Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Communication Network Found., 22 F.3d 1423, 1426 (8th Cir.
1994), rev’d, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
2. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877 (1963); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 367 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931), noting: “The maintenance of the opportunity
for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security
of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”).
3. Emerson, supra note 2, at 883 (noting that “the right of all members of society to form
their own beliefs and communicate them freely to others must be regarded as an essential
principle of a democratically-organized society” and further that “freedom of expression . . . is
indispensable to the operation of a democratic form of government.”).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for the redress of grievances.” Id.
1419

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1420

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:1419

Freedom of speech and expression has particular significance in the area of
political action,5 and one of the core First Amendment values is the protection
of political speech.6 This concept was profound at the inception of the First
Amendment.7 The Supreme Court has noted that the “Framers of the Bill of
Rights were most anxious to protect—speech that is ‘indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth.’”8 Since then the Supreme Court has
shown on several occasions that political speech enjoys particular significance
with regard to the First Amendment right to free speech.9 Accordingly, the
Court has held that “[t]he First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.’”10 The
Court has, therefore, consistently respected our “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.” 11 The Court further emphasized that:
[i]n a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to
make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for the
identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we are
to follow as a nation. . . . [So] it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional
guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of
campaigns for political office.12

Difficult questions arise, however, when the First Amendment rights of
some individuals clash with the First Amendment rights of others. In these
situations, the Supreme Court has been called upon to reconcile the rights of
both parties. For instance, over the last several decades, the Supreme Court
has struggled to balance the First Amendment rights of individuals with the
First Amendment rights of the press.13 Although freedom of the press is well
established in our Constitution, and broadcasters are not without protection
under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has made it clear that “it is the
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is

5. Emerson, supra note 2, at 883.
6. Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecomms. Comm’n., 917 F.2d 468, 493 (11th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 816 (1991).
7. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984) (quoting Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
8. Id.
9. See supra notes 1 & 8, and accompanying text; see infra notes 10-12 and accompanying
text.
10. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
11. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.254, 270 (1964) (citing Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) and De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)).
12. Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 417, 430 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976); and Monitor Patriot Company, 401 U.S. at 272).
13. See infra notes 84-123 and accompanying text.
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paramount.”14 In Arkansas Educational Television Commission15 v. Forbes,16
the Supreme Court was faced with the difficult task of weighing the First
Amendment right of an Arkansas congressional candidate to be included in a
televised debate, against the First Amendment right of a state-owned television
station to broadcast a debate with candidates it believed, in its journalistic
discretion, best satisfied the interests and needs of its audience.17
The Arkansas Educational Television Commission (“AETC”), a stateowned government broadcaster, excluded Ralph Forbes from a political debate
it broadcasted in anticipation of the 1992 election for the Third Congressional
District of Arkansas.18 Forbes, an independent “ballot qualified”19 candidate,
was excluded from the debate by AETC because the station concluded that he
did not have the appropriate “political viability” to participate.20 Forbes filed
suit against AETC claiming that his rights were violated under the First
Amendment and 47 U.S.C § 315.21 He sought injunctive and declaratory relief
as well as compensatory damages.22

14. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in the First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 523, 613 (1997); U.S. CONST. amend. I; Columbia Broadcasting System Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co.,
Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) and citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 166 (1948)).
15. The Arkansas Educational Television Commission is an “Arkansas state agency owning
and operating a network of five noncommercial television stations (Arkansas Educational
Television Network or AETN). The eight members of AETC are appointed by the Governor for
8-year terms and are removable only for good cause. . . . AETC members are barred from holding
any other state or federal office, with the exception of teaching positions.” Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1637 (1998) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-3102(a)(1), (3) (Michie Supp. 1997)).
16. Ralph Forbes is a “former American Nazi Party member who now calls himself a
Christian supremacist.” Roger K. Lowe, Public Stations Can Exclude Candidates, High Court
Rules, THE COLOMBUS DISPATCH, May 19, 1998, at 9A.
17. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633.
18. Id. at 1637.
19. Id. According to Arkansas law, in order to become a “ballot qualified” candidate, to have
your name qualified to appear on the ballot for the Third Congressional District seat, the
candidate must “file petitions signed by at least three percent of the qualified electors in the
district in which he is seeking office, provided, however, that no more than 2000 signatures are
required.” Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n (“Forbes II”), 93 F.3d 497 at 500 (8th
Cir. 1996) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. §7-7-103(c)(1) (1993) rev’d, 118 S. Ct. 1633.
20. Id. at 1638.
21. Id. 47 U.S.C. § 315 provides in pertinent part: “If any licensee shall permit any person
who is legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall
afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station . . . .”
22. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633.
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The United States Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that AETC’s
exclusion of Forbes from the debate “was a reasonable, viewpoint neutral
exercise of journalistic discretion consistent with the First Amendment.”23
This note analyzes the Supreme Court’s ruling in Forbes. More
specifically, it argues that AETC’s exclusion based on “political viability” was
a pretext for its viewpoint discrimination. Part II explains the development of
non-commercial broadcasting and how the Supreme Court has decided accessrelated First Amendment issues using the public forum doctrine.24 Part III
presents the facts and procedural history of Forbes and discusses the majority
and dissenting opinions.25 Part IV contains the author’s analysis of the
decision.26 The Note concludes by suggesting that Forbes’ effect will be farreaching and detrimental to independent candidates.27
II. HISTORY
A. A historical perspective of non-commercial educational broadcasting and
its regulation.
“The history of noncommercial, educational broadcasting in the United
States is as old as broadcasting itself.”28 In the beginning of broadcast
regulation, in 1912, the Federal Radio Commission (“FRC”) was the authority
over broadcasters.29 It was not until 1934 that the Federal Communication
Commission (“FCC”), the main broadcasting authority today, took over
broadcast regulation.30 During the first few decades of broadcast regulation,
Congress regulated commercial and non-commercial broadcasters in the same
manner.31 The Radio Act of 1927 followed by the Communications Act of
1934 laid the foundation for modern broadcast regulation.32 Under this
legislation, non-commercial educational broadcasting stations were subject to

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 1637.
See infra notes 28-123 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 124-272 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 273-90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 291-93 and accompanying text.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 367 (citing S. FROST, EDUCATION’S OWN
STATIONS 464 (1937)).
29. Gayle S. Ecabert, Comment, The Demise of the Fairness Doctrine: A Constitutional
Reevaluation of Content-Based Broadcasting Regulations, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 999, 1004 (1987).
30. Adrian Cronauer, The Fairness Doctrine: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 47 FED.
COMM. L.J. 51, 58-59 (1994).
31. Id. at 367.
32. See Ecabert, supra note 29, at 1004; Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162;
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
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the same licensing, renewal, and programming requirements as their
commercial counterparts.33
In the early years of broadcast regulation, the FCC imposed a set of
regulations known as the “fairness doctrine” to protect the interests of the
listeners by guaranteeing diversity in what was being broadcast.34 This
doctrine required broadcasters to represent all sides of issues that were of
public importance.35 The concept of fair treatment of important issues was
raised in the early national radio conferences and actually predated the
enactment of the 1927 radio legislation.36 As implemented in 1927, the
doctrine contained an equal opportunity provision for qualified candidates.37
Sixty years later, many thought that the fairness doctrine had become
unnecessary due to the expanded marketplace and media outlets.38 As a result,
the doctrine was dropped in 1987.39
Today, 47 U.S.C. § 315 provides that “[i]f any licensee shall permit any
person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such
candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station.”40
33. League of Women Voters, 486 U.S. at 367.
34. Thomas F. Ackley, Political Candidates’ First Amendment Rights Can be Trumped By
Journalists’ Editorial Rights: Candidates Barred From Public Television Debate in Marcus v.
Iowa Public Television, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 475, 484 (citing DOM CARISTI, EXPANDING
FREE EXPRESSION IN THE MARKETPLACE: BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC FORUM 74-75
(1992)); see Ecabert, supra note 29, at 1000 (citing D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 584-601 (4th
ed. 1987) (discussing Fairness Doctrine); see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1986) for the
administrative regulations implementing the Fairness Doctrine).
35. Ecabert, supra note 29, at 1004.
36. Fourth National Radio Conference Proceedings & Recommendations for Regulation of
Radio 6 (Washington D.C. Nov. 9-11, 1925).
37. Escabert, supra note 29 at 1005; H.R. REP. NO. 69-1886 (1927). Section 18 as enacted
provides:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public
office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such
candidates for that office . . . and the Commission shall make rules and regulations to
carry this provision into effect; provided, that such a licensee shall not have power of
censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of the section. No obligation
is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.
44 Stat. 1162, sec. 18 (1927).
38. Cronauer, supra note 30, at 51.
39. Id.
40. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994). Section 315 further provides:
Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any—
(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the
presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary, or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to political
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In the 1930s, commercial broadcasting expanded greatly and the number of
non-commercial broadcasters began to shrink.41 As a result, in 1939,
recognizing the trend toward commercial broadcasting and realizing that
commercial pressures could eventually take over educational stations, the FCC
decided to step in and reserve certain frequencies for educational radio.42 Six
years later, the FCC allocated twenty radio frequencies on the FM spectrum
exclusively for educational use.43 Similarly, with the advent of television in
1952, the FCC reserved the use of certain television channels for the sole
purpose of educational programming.44 During this period, several noncommercial educational stations developed.45 State and local governments
funded some of these stations; foundation grants and private donations funded
others; and Congress, in 1962, began providing direct financial assistance to
non-commercial broadcasters.46
Congress, via the Educational Television Act of 1962, authorized the
former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to distribute $32 million
in matching grants over a five-year period to be used for the construction of
non-commercial television facilities.47 Five years later, in 1967, a special
commission was formed to review the state of federal broadcasting.48 The
commission found that local stations were hobbled by chronic underfinancing.49 The commission decided that in order for non-commercial
educational broadcasters to survive as a viable alternative to commercial
broadcasting, the stations needed funding from the federal government to
supplement the existing state, local, and private financing.50 In addition, the
commission recommended the creation of a nonprofit, non-governmental
“Corporation for Public Television” to provide support for the non-commercial
broadcasting stations. The duties of that Corporation were to include funding

conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of this
subsection.
Id.
41. League of Women Voters, 486 U.S. at 367.
42. Id. (citing 47 CFR §§ 4.131-4.133 (1939)).
43. Id. at 367 (citing FCC, Report of Proposed Allocations 77 (1945)).
44. Id. (citing Television Assignments, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952)).
45. Id. See Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, Public Television: A Program
for Action 21-29 (1967) (hereinafter “Carnegie I”); Carnegie Commission on the Future of Public
Broadcasting, A Public Trust 33-34 (1979) (hereinafter “Carnegie II”); see also S. Rep. No. 93123, pp. 2-6 (1973).
46. League of Women Voters, 486 U.S. at 367; Carnegie Commission on Educational
Television, supra note 45.
47. Id., at 368 (citing Educational Television Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64).
48. Id. The Commission was sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation. Id.
49. Id. (citing Carnegie I at 33-38).
50. Id.
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for new program production, funding for local station operations, and the
establishment of satellite interconnection facilities to permit nationwide
distribution of educational programs to all local stations that wished to receive
them.51
Also in 1967, Congress enacted the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967
which amended the Communications Act of 1934 and is the basic framework
of today’s public broadcasting system.52 Its goal was “to support and promote
the development of non-commercial, educational broadcasting stations.”53 The
Act provided that its purpose was to be accomplished by:
extending and improving the provisions thereof relating to grants for
construction of educational television broadcasting facilities, by authorizing
assistance in the construction of noncommercial educational radio broadcasting
facilities, by establishing a nonprofit corporation to assist in establishing
innovative educational programs, to facilitate educational program availability,
and to aid the operation of educational broadcasting facilities; and to authorize
a comprehensive study of instructional television and radio . . . .54

Furthermore, Title I of the Act authorized $38 million to be appropriated to
carrying out the aforementioned purposes over a four-year period.55 Title II
etablished a nonprofit educational broadcasting corporation.56
This
corporation was “authorized to disburse federal funds to noncommercial
television and radio stations in support of station operation and educational
programming.”57
The purpose and activities of the Corporation included but were not limited
to: “the production of . . . education television or radio programs for national or
regional distribution, . . . to aid in financing local educational television or

51. League of Women Voters, 486 U.S. at 368. Although these recommendations were in
reference to “public television,” which were intended to include instructional, educational,
political, and cultural programming, Congress later applied them to non-commercial radio
stations as well. See Carnegie I at 1.
52. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 47 U.S.C. § 390; League
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 368.
53. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 366.
54. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 81 Stat. at 365.
55. Id. The Act provided for the appropriation of “$10,500,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1968, $12,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and $15,000,000 for the
fiscal year ending July 1, 1971.” Id.
56. Id. at 367-69. Section 396(c) provides: “The corporation shall have a Board of
Directors . . . , consisting of fifteen members appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate. . . . The term of office of each member of the Board shall be six
years . . . .” Id. at 369. The structure of the Board was modified in 1981 to provide for 10,
instead of 15 members. 47 U.S.C. § 396(c), as amended by Pub. L. 97-35, Title XII, §
1225(a)(1), 95 Stat. 726. See League of Women Voters, 468 at 370 n.4.
57. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 366.
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radio programming costs,”58 and “to arrange . . . for interconnection facilities
suitable for distribution and transmission of educational television or radio
programs to noncommercial educational broadcast stations.”59 Finally, in
order to ensure that they were carrying out their activities “in ways that will
most effectively assure the maximum freedom of the noncommercial
educational . . . stations throughout the United States,”60 the Corporation was
not allowed to “own or operate any television or radio broadcast station,
system, or network . . . .”61
Today, about two-thirds of the 348 public television stations in the country
are licensed to state and local governments.62 The FCC now grants licenses for
the operation of television broadcasting stations for a period no longer than
eight years.63 After each eight-year term, broadcasters must apply for renewal
of their licenses.64 One important factor in the FCC’s decision to renew a
broadcaster’s license is whether they promote “public interest” broadcasting.65
Specifically, Congress and the FCC have established rules to ensure
greater access to the airwaves for political candidates with diverse
viewpoints.66 Section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 provided
that “[n]o noncommercial educational broadcasting station may engage in
editorializing or may support or oppose any candidate for political office.”67
Although the Supreme Court held this invalid, 47 U.S.C. § 399 is the
comparable statute today. It provides that “[n]o noncommercial educational
broadcasting station may support or oppose any candidate for political
office.”68 Additionally, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) of the U.S.C. allows the FCC to
sanction any station for “willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access
to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a
58. 42 U.S.C. § 396(g)(2)(B)&(C).
59. See id. § 396(g)(2)(E).
60. See id. §396(g)(1)(d).
61. See id. §396(g)(3).
62. Linda Greenhouse, Public TV has no duty to also-rans, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER
(Raliegh, N.C.), May 19, 1998, at A1.
63. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (1994); 62 Fed. Reg. 5339, 5347 (1997) (codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1020).
64. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c); see also 47 U.S.C. § 309(k) (1994) (license and renewal
procedures).
65. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(d)(2).
66. Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the
Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1694 (1997).
67. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 81 Stat. at 368. This Section was amended in the
Broadcasting Amendments of 1981 and forbid “noncommercial educational broadcasting station
which receives a grant from the Corporation” to engage in “editorializing,” but the Supreme
Court held the restriction to be invalid. League of Women Voters, 486 U.S. at 402; Public
Broadcasting Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 730, amending § 399 of the Public
Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 47 U.S.C. § 390.
68. See 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1994).
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broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office
on behalf of his candidacy.”69
B. The First Amendment and Political Speech
The Supreme Court has held on several occasions that political speech is at
the heart of First Amendment values.70 Furthermore, the Court has
emphasized “that restrictions on access to the electoral process must survive
exacting scrutiny.”71 The Court explained that limitations on access could be
justified only when the interests advanced are of paramount, and vital
importance.72 “The burden is on the government to show the existence of such
an interest.”73 Moreover, “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”74
Although the Supreme Court had recognized issues relating to public
forums for some time,75 the phrase “public forum” was not coined until 1965.76
In 1972, the Court used the concept of the “public forum” in relation to First
Amendment jurisprudence for the first time,77 and by 1984, this concept had
elevated to the status of “a fundamental principle of First Amendment
doctrine.”78 The doctrine divides government property into three main
categories and attempts to set rules governing the regulation of expression in
accordance with those categories.79
Analysis of First Amendment questions relating to access of government
property often begins by assessing the type of forum involved.80 First the court
determines the nature of the “property” involved, which is central to a

69. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994).
70. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
71. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93-94 (1976).
72. Id. at 94.
73. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 94).
74. Id. at 373 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
75. See, e.g., Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)
(Roberts, J., concurring) (“Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.”).
76. Harry Kalven coined the phrase “public forum.” See Robert C. Post, Between
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1713, 1718 (1987); see also Harry Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana,
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
77. Id. at 1714.
78. Id. (quoting Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 280
(1984)).
79. See id. at 1715.
80. Richard B. Saphire, Reconsidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 739,
739-740 (1991).
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determination of whether the forum is public or non-public.81 Then, depending
on what kind of forum is involved, the court will then apply a specific level of
First Amendment scrutiny.82 Over the last several decades, the Supreme Court
has used this two-step process to decide cases involving the exclusion of an
individual or group from government “property.” The Court has divided
forums into three basic categories: (1) unlimited public forum, also referred to
as “traditional public forums;” (2) limited public forums; and (3) and nonpublic forums.83
Traditional public forums, which the Supreme Court referred to in Perry
Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., as “quintessential public
forums,” are places that traditionally have been “devoted to assembly and
debate.”84 This type of forum severely limits the rights of the state to restrict
expressive activity.85 Examples of such forums are public streets and parks.86
The government may not restrict or prohibit expressive activity in such forums
based on the content of the activity unless it can “show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end.”87 The state may, however, enforce “regulations of time,
place and manner of expression which are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.”88
A second category, public forums, consists of public property that the state
has opened specifically for use by the public for expressive activity.89 An
example of such a forum is a town’s municipal auditorium open for use by the
public.90 Even when the state is not required to create this type of forum, once
it is created, the Constitution forbids certain exclusions from the forum in the
same way it would forbid exclusions from all forums generally open to the
public.91 Although there is no required time in which the state must maintain
the “open character of the facility,” for the period that it is so maintained, the
81. See Jonathan H. Beemer, Denver Area Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC &
the Forum Status of Cable Access Channels, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 955, 973-74; see also Perry
Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1982).
82. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-47.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 45.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 445, 461 (1980)).
88. Id.(citing United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh, 453 U.S. 114, 132
(1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-536 (1980);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); and Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
89. Id.
90. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975).
91. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
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state is bound by the same standards and regulations that apply in a traditional
public forum.92 The government can set restrictions as to time, place, and
manner, as long as they are reasonable, but any “content-based prohibition
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.”93
The Supreme Court has also recognized a second type of public forum, a
“limited public forum,” which has a more limited character than the public
forum.94 A limited public forum is “created for a limited purpose such as use
by certain groups. . .or for the discussion of certain subjects.”95
The final category, non-public forums, is governed by different standards
than the public forums.96 Non-public forums consist of “(p)ublic property
which is not by tradition of designation a forum for public
communication . . .”97 The Supreme Court explained in Perry that the First
Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because that
property is “owned or controlled by the government.”98 With regard to nonpublic forums, the state may set time, place, and manner regulations.”99 In
addition, the state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes and limit
access to the non-public forum “as long as the regulation on speech is
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker’s view.”100
In Perry, the Supreme Court held that an interschool mail facility was a
non-public forum.101 In this case, a teachers union, the Perry Local Educators’
Association (“PLEA”), brought an action challenging a provision of a
collective bargaining agreement between the Perry school district and the Perry
teachers’ representative union.102 This provision gave the representative union
access to the teachers’ mailboxes and an interschool mail system that rival
unions were denied.103 In addition to allowing the representative union access
to the mail system, some principals permitted various private organizations to

92. Id. at 46.
93. Id. (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70).
94. The Supreme Court in Widmar concluded that the university created a limited public
forum by opening its facilities to registered student groups for expressive speech. Widmar, 454
U.S. at 272.
95. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. 236 (student groups) and City of
Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167
(1976) (school board business)).
96. Id. at 46.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981)).
99. Id.
100. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (citing Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 131 n.7).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 39.
103. Id.
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use the mailboxes to distribute messages.104 A rival union brought an action
against the teachers’ representative union and specific members of the school
board claiming that this barring of access to the teachers’ interschool mail
system violated its constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.105
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
granted summary judgment for the defendants.106 The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals for the reversed, reasoning that the school board failed to provide a
reason for denying access to outside unions.107 The Supreme Court reversed
holding that “PLEA did not have a First Amendment or other right of access to
the interschool mail system.”108 The Court concluded that “[t]his type of
selective access does not transform government property into a public
forum.”109 Moreover, the limitations on PLEA’s access to the school mail
system satisfied the reasonableness standard for non-public forums because the
substantial alternative channels remained open for the unions to communicate
with the teachers.110
Similarly, in Cornelius v. NAACP, the Supreme Court held that an annual
charity drive that took place in a federal workplace was a non-public forum.111
In Cornelius, the Court followed the same two-step analysis used in Perry:
discern what type of forum is involved and whether the limitations to access
survive the standard of scrutiny applicable for that forum.112 As part of the
forum analysis, the Court looked at the access sought by the speaker.113
The issue in Cornelius was whether the federal government violated the
First Amendment when it excluded legal defense and political advocacy
organizations from participating in the Combined Federal Campaign (“CFC”),
a charity drive aimed at federal employees allowed to take place in the federal
workplace.114 President Reagan limited participation in the CFC drive to

104. Id.
105. Perry, 460 U.S. at 41.
106. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 460
U.S. 37 (1983).
107. Id.
108. Perry, 460 U.S. at 54.
109. Id. at 47.
110. Id. at 53.
111. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 801. The Supreme Court noted that:
in defining the forum we have focused on the access sought by the speakers. When
speakers seek general access to public property, the forum encompasses that property. . . .
In cases in which limited access is sought, our cases have taken a more tailored approach
to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum within the confines of the government property.
Id. (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)).
114. Id. at 790.
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“voluntary, charitable, health and welfare agencies that provide or support
direct health and welfare services to individuals or their families.”115 This
excluded “agencies that seek to influence the outcomes of elections or the
determination of public policy through political activity or advocacy, lobbying,
or litigation on behalf of parties other than themselves.”116 Some of the
excluded agencies filed suit against the federal government alleging that
restricting them from seeking charitable contributions was a violation of their
First Amendment and equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment.117
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted
summary judgment for petitioners stating that this type of exclusion was
content-based and, therefore unconstitutional.118 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the trial court’s
decision,119 but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
Government did not violate the First Amendment when it limited participation
in the CFC “in order to minimize disruption to the federal workplace, to ensure
the success of the fund-raising effort, or to avoid the appearance of political
favoritism.”120 The Court concluded that such speech was of the type
protected by the First Amendment.121 The CFC was a non-public forum
because of the government policy used in creating the CFC, its practice in
limiting access,122 and the government’s reasons for denying access satisfied
the reasonableness standard necessary for non-public forum exclusion.123

The CFC is an annual charitable fund-raising drive conducted . . . during working hours
largely through the voluntary efforts of federal employees . . . .[P]articipating
organizations confined their fundraising activities to a 30-word statement submitted by
them for inclusion in the campaign literature. Volunteer federal employees distribute to
their co-workers literature describing the campaign and the participants along with pledge
cards. Contributions may take the form of either a payroll deduction or a lump-sum
payment made to a designated agency or to the general Campaign fund.
Id. at 790-91 (citing 5 C.F.R. §§ 950.521(c) & (e) (1983)).
115. Id. at 794-95 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,353, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1983)).
116. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 794-95 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,353, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1983)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 796.
119. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Devine, 727 F.2d 1247, 1248-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), rev’d, 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
120. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 813.
121. Id. at 799.
122. Id. at 806.
123. Id. at 810-11.
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III. ARKANSAS EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION V. FORBES
A. Facts and Procedural History of Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes.
In the spring of 1992, the Arkansas Educational Television Commission
(“AETC”) decided to sponsor a series of five debates between candidates for
federal office in the November elections of that year.124 Of the debates
scheduled to be televised, one was for the Senate election and one was for each
of the four congressional elections in Arkansas.125 The AETC staff developed
a format for the debates which allowed for 53 minutes of each 1-hour debate to
be used for the candidates answering questions.126 As a result of this time
constraint, AETC decided that it would “limit participation in the debates to
the major party candidates and any other candidate who had strong popular
support.”127
On June 17, 1992, AETC extended an invitation to the Republican and
Democratic candidates for Arkansas’ Third Congressional District to
participate in the debate for that seat.128 Two months later, Ralph Forbes
became certified as an independent candidate and qualified to appear on the
ballot for that same district.129 On August 24, 1992, Forbes requested
permission from AETC to participate in the debate for his district, scheduled
for October 22, 1992.130 AETC Executive Director Susan Howarth denied his
request on September 4. Mrs. Howarth explained that AETC decided in their
journalistic judgment that their viewers would be best served by a debate
limited to the Republican and Democratic candidates.131
On October 19, 1992, Forbes filed suit against AETC in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas seeking an injunction and
declaratory relief as well as damages.132 Forbes claimed that his exclusion
from the debate violated his rights under the First Amendment and 47 U.S.C. §
315.133 The district court denied Forbes’ request for a preliminary injunction

124. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1637. The AETC is a “state agency owning and operating a
network of five noncommercial television stations.” Id.; see supra note 15 and accompanying
text.
125. Id.
126. Id. The AETC worked closely with Bill Simmons, the Arkansas Bureau Chief for the
Associated Press, in planning the debates. Id.
127. Id. (citing Record, Affidavit of Bill Simmons ¶ 5).
128. Id. at 1637.
129. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1637; see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
130. Id. at 1638.
131. Id.
132. Id.; Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Network Found. (“Forbes I”),
22 F.3d 1423, 1426 (8th Cir. 1994), rev’d, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
133. Id. For the text of 47 U.S.C. § 315, see supra note 40.
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mandating his inclusion in the debate.134 In addition, the court dismissed his
complaint in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.135 The district court
based its decision solely on Forbes’ complaint; AETC had not even filed an
answer yet.136
Forbes appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which also denied
his request for a preliminary injunction.137 Sitting en banc, the court affirmed
the dismissal of Forbes’ statutory claim and held that he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, but reversed the dismissal of his First Amendment
claim and remanded the action for further proceedings.138 The Court stated
that Forbes had “a qualified right of access created by AETN’s139 sponsorship
of a debate, and that AETN must have [had] a legitimate reason to exclude him
strong enough to survive First Amendment scrutiny.”140 The Court reasoned
that “there was no way of knowing, on the state of the record as it existed, why
AETV141 had excluded Mr. Forbes.”142
On remand, Forbes’ First Amendment claim was tried to a jury.143 After
being instructed by the district court that the debate in question was, as a
matter of law, a non-public forum, the jury found by special verdict that the
decision to exclude Forbes from the debate was neither the result of political
pressure, nor was it based on opposition towards his political views.144 In
accordance with the jury’s findings, judgment was entered for the
defendants.145 Forbes appealed to the Eighth Circuit again, arguing that “the
debate was a limited public forum, and that the reason given for excluding
him, . . . even if it was the true reason, was not legally sufficient.”146
On appeal the second time, the Eighth Circuit agreed with Forbes and held
“that a governmentally owned and controlled television station may not
exclude a candidate, legally qualified under state law, from a debate organized

134. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1638.
135. Forbes I, 22 F.3d at 1427.
136. Id. at 1430.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. “AETN” stands for Arkansas Educational Television Commission Network Foundation.
This is the same as AETC. The trial and appellate courts used the full name and the AETN
abbreviation, while the Supreme Court dropped “Network Foundation” from the petitioner’s
name and referred to them as AETC.
140. Forbes I, 22 F.3d at 1428.
141. “AETV” stands for Arkansas Educational Television and is the same as AETN and
AETC. The Court dropped the “Commission Network Foundation” from the name.
142. Forbes II, 93 F.3d at 499.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 501.
146. Id. at 499-500.
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by it on such a subjective ground.”147 In coming to this conclusion, the court
identified the main issue of the case as “whether the congressional debate
staged by AETN was a limited-purpose public forum, or a non-public forum,
and, if it was the former, whether AETN’s reason for excluding Mr. Forbes
could survive scrutiny under the First Amendment.”148 The court reasoned that
the government created a limited public forum because AETN opened their
debate to a particular class of speakers; candidates legally qualified to appear
on the ballot.149 After determining that the debate was a limited public forum,
the Eighth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the reason given for the
exclusion.150 The court concluded that it was crucial that the employees of
AETC were not ordinary journalists, but employees of the government.151
Furthermore, the court held that “[t]he First Amendment exists to protect
individuals, not government. The question of political viability is, indeed, so
subjective, so arguable, so susceptible of variation in individual opinion, as to
provide no secure basis for the exercise of governmental power consistent with
the First Amendment.”152
Subsequently, AETC appealed to the United States Supreme Court.153 On
March 17, petitioner’s writ of certiorari was granted.154 Oral arguments were
heard on October 8, 1998, and the decision was handed down on May 18,
1998.155 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in part because the decision in
Forbes II created a split between the Eighth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecommunications Commission
(“GPTC”).156
In Chandler, Walker Chandler, a Libertarian candidate, was denied access
to a debate held by GPTC on November 2, 1990 for candidates seeking the
office of lieutenant governor of Georgia.157 Although not allowed to
participate in the debate, GPTC offered Chandler thirty minutes of airtime on
its stations to present his views.158 On September 17, Chandler filed suit
147. Forbes II, 93 F.3d at 499.
148. Id. at 502.
149. Id. at 504.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 505.
152. Forbes II, 93 F.3d at 505.
153. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1637.
154. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 117 S. Ct. 1243 (1997), cert. granted, 65
USLW 3619, (U.S. Mar. 17 1997) (NO. 96-779). At least thirteen amicus briefs were filed. Id.
Groups submitting briefs included the Association of America’s Public Television Stations, the
FCC, the Commission on Presidential Debates, and the American Civil Liberties Union with the
ACLU of Arkansas. Id.
155. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1633.
156. 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990).
157. Id. at 488.
158. Id. at 488 n.1.
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against the GPTC, an instrumentality of the state of Georgia, seeking to enjoin
it from broadcasting the debate unless he was included as a participant, and
claiming that his exclusion violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.159
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
Atlanta Division, heard Chandler’s motion.160 GPTC contended that the
district court did not have jurisdiction over the matter, and that it should be
handled by the FCC in accordance with 47 U.S.C. § 315.161 The district court,
however, did not agree.162 The court reasoned that Chandler was not suing
GPTC in its capacity as a broadcaster, nor was he suing under § 315 for an
equal opportunity.163 Chandler was suing GPTC members “in their capacities
as state officials for alleged constitutional violations.”164 The court found for
Chandler and held that GPTC had violated Chandler’s freedom of speech and
equal protection rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
respectively.165
The court flatly rejected the claim that the GPTC had a journalistic right to
choose which candidates could express their views based on their
newsworthiness or interest to the public.166 Moreover, the court held that
GPTC’s exclusion of third-party candidates from the debate was content-based
and therefore, was “a constitutionally impermissible prior restraint based upon
content.”167 In regard to the equal protection claim, the court found that GPTC
did not give “any legitimate public purpose or rational purpose for excluding
the third-party candidates.”168 Finally, the district court enjoined GPTC from
televising the debate unless it included the Libertarian candidates.169
GPTC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.170 The Court did not go through the usual forum analysis used in

159. Id. The Libertarian candidate for governor, Carole Ann Rand, intervened as plaintiff and
joined Chandler’s action. She sought a similar injunction against the broadcast of a similar
debate on November 4, 1990 between the Democratic and Republican candidates for governor.
Id.
160. Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecomm. Comm’n, 749 F. Supp. 264, 265 (N.D. Ga. 1990),
vacated, 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Chandler I”).
161. Id. at 266 & n.3. For the text of 47 U.S.C. § 315 see supra note 40.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 266-67.
164. Id. at 266.
165. Chandler I, 749 F. Supp. 264, 268-69.
166. Id. at 268.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 269.
169. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 488. This holding applied to the debate GPTC was planning to
hold for governor of Georgia as well as the debate for lieutenant governor. Id.
170. Id. at 490.
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access related First Amendment cases.171 Instead, it focused on “the mission
of the communicative activity being controlled.”172 The court discussed
GPTC’s obligation to serve the interests of the state of Georgia.173 Unlike the
Supreme Court in Forbes,174 the Eleventh Circuit did not recognize a
distinction between the First Amendment restrictions placed on a state-owned
television station’s journalistic discretion in regular programming and
candidate debates.175 The court reasoned that GPTC employees “make
editorial decisions on a daily basis determining which programs to air in order
meet the needs and interests of Georgia’s citizens.”176
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order permanently and
remanded, holding that GPTC’s decision to exclude Chandler was contentbased but not viewpoint restrictive and did not violate the First Amendment.177
In addition, the court briefly reviewed the equal protection issue and concluded
that Chandler was not a member of a protected class, and thus GPTC needed
only a rational basis for their decision to exclude him.178 The Eleventh Circuit
found that GPTC’s arguments were rational, and therefore no Equal Protection
violation occurred.179
B. The United States Supreme Court Decision
In Forbes, the Supreme Court addressed the following three issues. First,
by reason of state-ownership, did AETC have a constitutional obligation to
give every legally qualified candidate access to its debate?180 Second, was the
debate itself a limited public forum or a non-public forum under forum
precedents?181 Finally, was AETC’s decision to exclude Forbes a reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion?182 In a 6-3 decision
written by Justice Kennedy,183 the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s

171. Id. at 488-90; see supra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
172. Id. at 488.
173. Id.
174. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633. The Supreme Court in Forbes concluded that the regular
programming of a state-owned television broadcaster was not a forum at all, and therefore not
subject to the First Amendment restrictions on accessibility, however, candidate debates were an
exception to this. Id. at 1640.
175. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 488-89.
176. Id. at 488.
177. Id. at 488-90.
178. Id. at 489 (citing Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 722 (11th Cir. 1990)).
179. Id.
180. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1637.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Chief Justice Renquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer joined the
opinion. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633.
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decision.184 The Court found that the debate was a non-public forum and
AETC did not have an obligation to include all legally qualified candidates.185
Furthermore, AETC’s decision to exclude Forbes from the debate was a
“reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion” consistent
with the First Amendment.186
1. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court first addressed the threshold issue of whether public
forum principles apply to the AETC debate.187 Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, emphasized that traditional public forums such as streets and
parks, which require unlimited access by constitutional mandate, “should not
be extended in a mechanical way to the very different context of public
television broadcasting.”188 According to the majority, this “mechanical”
analysis would be antithetical to the journalistic discretion of the stations.189
From the outset of the opinion, the Court made it clear that there was little
distinction between the journalistic discretion of AETC and private
broadcasters.190 The Court noted that “television broadcasters enjoy the
‘widest journalistic freedom’ consistent with their public responsibilities”191 of
“public interest, convenience, and necessity”.192 Furthermore, the Court stated
that “[p]ublic and private broadcasters alike are not only permitted, but indeed
required, to exercise substantial editorial discretion in the selection and
presentation of their programming.”193
The Court, however, distinguished between public broadcasting as a
whole, which is not subject to strict scrutiny under the forum doctrine, and
candidate debates, which are a narrow exception to that rule.194 The Court set
out two reasons for this exception. First, contrary to regular programming,
“the debate was by design a forum for political speech,” to allow the

184. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1637.
185. Id. at 1643.
186. Id..
187. Id. at 1639.
188. Id. When a public forum is found to exist, that fact is sufficient to support a claim of
access to that forum as a matter of constitutional law. Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles,
Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 88 n.17 (1988) (citing Kalven,
supra note 74, at 29-30).
189. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1639.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 110 (1973)).
192. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 309(a)).
193. Id. The Court recognized that “beyond doubt” editors of newspaper and broadcast “can
and do abuse this [editorial] power.” But, these “[c]alculated risks of abuse are taken in order to
preserve higher values.” Id. (quoting Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 412 U.S. at 124-25).
194. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1640.
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candidates to “express their views with minimal intrusion” by the AETC.195
Second, throughout the history of candidate debates, it has been understood
and accepted that they are of “exceptional significance in the electoral
process.”196 As a result, the Court held that the AETC debate was a forum, and
subsequently selected the public forum precedents to answer the question of
which type.197
To determine which type of forum the debates represented, the Court
looked to the categories of speech fora already established and discussed in its
previous opinions.198 Three categories of fora were identified and described:
199
the traditional public forum,200 the designated public forum,201 and the
nonpublic forum. 202 The Court explained that traditional public fora are
defined by “objective characteristics of the property, such as whether, ‘by long
tradition or by government fiat,’ the property has been ‘devoted to assembly
and debate.’”203 Furthermore, the Court described the scrutiny to be applied
when examining denial of access to each type of forum. A speaker can be
excluded from a traditional public forum “only when the exclusion is necessary
to serve a compelling state interest, and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest.”204 Since both parties to the suit agreed that the AETC
debate was not a traditional public forum, the Court then turned its attention to
whether the debate was a public forum or a nonpublic forum.
The Court explained that a designated public forum is “created by
purposeful governmental action.”205 The exclusion of a speaker that falls
within the class the forum is generally made available, is subject to the same
strict scrutiny as a traditional public forum.206 All other government property
195. Id. The Court also distinguishes the debate from a talk show, because during a talk
show, the host can express “partisan views” and limit discussion to those ideas. Id.
196. Id. The Court further stated: “it is of particular importance that candidates have the
opportunity . . . to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the
candidates’ personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before choosing among
them on election day.” Id. (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981)).
197. Id. at 1640-41.
198. Id.; see supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
199. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1641 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
200. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
203. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1641 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45).
204. Id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800).
205. Id. The Court noted that “[t]he government does not create a [designated] public forum
by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional
[public] forum for public discourse.” Further, the Court specified that in deciding if a designated
public forum is involved in a case, “the Court has looked to the policy and practice of the
government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to
assembly and debate as a public forum.” Id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
206. Id. at 1641.
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is either a nonpublic forum or not a forum at all.207 If the property in question
is a nonpublic forum, the government can restrict access “as long as the
restrictions are reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”208
The Court’s analysis focused on the type of access the government
intended to permit when it created two types of fora.209 The Court used several
cases to illustrate the difference between “‘general access,’ which indicates the
property is a designated public forum, and ‘selective access,’ which indicates
the property is a nonpublic forum.”210 The Court compared the public forum
created in Widmar v. Vincent211 with the nonpublic fora created in Perry212
and Cornelius.213
In Widmar, a state university “generally opened” meeting facilities to
registered student groups, and thereby created a designated public forum.214 In
contrast, the school board in Perry intended that there be only “selective
access” to the school mail system.215 The school board enforced a policy that
required individuals to obtain permission from the principal of the individual
school before access to the mail system could be granted.216 Similarly, in
Cornelius, the Combined Federal Campaign (“CFC”) drive was a nonpublic
forum because the Government consistently limited participation in the CFC to
charitable, rather than political, volunteer agencies and required that each
agency obtain permission from federal and local campaign officials before they
were granted access.217
The Court concluded that the AETC debate was a nonpublic forum with
selective access similar to that in Perry and Cornelius.218 The Court noted
that, although the government “creates a designated public forum when it
makes its property generally available to a certain class of speakers,” it “does
not create a designated public forum when it does no more than reserve
eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose
members must then, as individuals, ‘obtain permission.’”219 The Court
207. Id.
208. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1641.
209. Id. at 1642.
210. Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803-05). The Court stated that “[a] designated public
forum is not created when the government allows selective access for individual speakers rather
than general access for a class of speakers.” Id.
211. Id.(quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264 (1981)).
212. Id.; see supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
213. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1642; see supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
214. Id. (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267).
215. Id. (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 47).
216. Id. (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 47).
217. Id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804).
218. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643.
219. Id. at 1642 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804). The court stated:
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reasoned that AETC’s debate was not generally available to candidates for
Arkansas’ Third Congressional District seat, but instead that AETC “reserved
eligibility for participation . . . to candidates for the Third Congressional . . .
seat.”220 Then, “AETC made candidate-by-candidate determinations as to
which of the eligible candidates would [be invited to] participate in the
debate.”221
The Court concluded that this type of selective access,
“unsupported by evidence of a purposeful designation for public use, [did] not
create a public forum.”222
The Court then considered the practical implications of the Eighth
Circuit’s determination that AETC’s debate was a limited public forum, rather
than a nonpublic forum.223 The Court concluded that not only did the Eighth
Circuit misapply their precedents, but that the “Court of Appeals’ holding
would result in less speech, not more.”224 Furthermore, the Court stated its
concern that in ruling that AETC’s “debate was a public forum open to all
ballot-qualified candidates, the Court of Appeals would place a severe burden
upon public broadcasters who air candidates’ views.”225 The Court reasoned
that if a broadcaster were required to include all legally qualified candidates it
“might choose not to air the candidates’ views at all.”226 The Court concluded
that “[a] First Amendment jurisprudence yielding these results does not
promote speech but represses it.”227

[t]he Cornelius distinction between general and selective access furthers First Amendment
interests. By recognizing the distinction, we encourage the government to open its
property to some expressive activity in cases where, if faced with an all-or-nothing
choice, it might not open the property at all. That this distinction turns on governmental
intent does not render it unprotective of speech. Rather, it reflects the reality that, with
the exception of traditional public fora, the government retains the choice of whether to
designate its property as a forum for specified classes of speakers.
Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1642-43.
222. Id. at 1643 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805).
223. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643.
224. Id.
225. Id. The Court noted: “in each of the 1988, 1992, and 1996 Presidential elections, . . . no
fewer than 22 candidates appeared on the ballot in at least one State.” Id. (citing Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Presidential Debates, Let America Decide 148 (1995)); Federal
Election Commission, Federal Elections 92, at 9 (1993); Federal Election Commission, Federal
Elections 96, at 11 (1997)). Furthermore, the Court noted: “[i]n the 1996 congressional elections,
it was common for 6 to 11 candidates to qualify for the ballot for a particular seat.” Id. (citing
1996 Election Results, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3250-57 (1996)).
226. Id. The Court notes that as a result of the Eighth Circuit’s decision in this case, “the
Nebraska Educational Television Network canceled a scheduled debate between candidates in
Nebraska’s 1996 United States Senate race.” Id. (citing LINCOLN J. STAR, Aug. 24, 1996, at 1A).
227. Id.
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Finally, the Court directed its attention to the exclusion of Forbes from the
AETC debate. The Court explained that although the debate was a nonpublic
forum, AETN did not have the power to exclude any candidate it wished.228
The Court stated that “[t]o be consistent with the First Amendment, the
exclusion . . . must not be based on the speaker’s viewpoint and must otherwise
be reasonable in light of the purpose of the property.”229
The Court found that AETC’s decision to exclude Forbes was
reasonable.230 A jury found the exclusion was not based on objection or
opposition to Forbes’ views, and the majority believed that the record
supported this finding.231 Susan Howarth, AETC’s executive director, gave
five reasons AETC excluded Forbes from the debate: (1) “[T]he Arkansas
voters did not consider him a serious candidate”; (2) “the news organizations
also did not consider him a serious candidate”; (3) “the Associated Press and a
national election result reporting service did not plan to run his name in results
on election night”; (4) “Forbes ‘apparently had little, if any, financial
support’”; and (5) “there [was] no ‘Forbes for Congress’ campaign
headquarters other than his house.”232 The Court concluded that the issue of
Forbes’ exclusion was “beyond dispute.”233 It stated that Forbes was not
excluded because of his viewpoints or in an attempt to manipulate the political
process, but because he had not generated any “appreciable public interest.”234
Accordingly, the Supreme Court overruled the Eighth Circuit and held that
AETC’s “decision to exclude Forbes was a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral
exercise of journalistic discretion consistent with the First Amendment.”235
2. Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Stevens236 began by conceding “that a state-owned
television network has no ‘constitutional obligation to allow every candidate
228. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643. The Court further emphasized that just because the debate is
a nonpublic forum that “does not mean that the government can restrict speech in whatever way it
likes.” Id. (quoting International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 687
(1992)).
229. Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800).
230. Id.
231. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a.) The Court noted that Susan Howarth, AETC
executive director, testified that “Forbes’ views had ‘absolutely’ no role in the decision to
exclude him from the debate.” Id. (quoting App. 142).
232. Id. (quoting App. 142 at 126-127). The Court also mentioned that “Forbes himself
described his campaign organization as ‘bedlam’ and the media coverage of his campaign as
‘zilch.’” Id. (quoting App. 142 at 91, 96).
233. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644.
234. Id.
235. Id., at 1644.
236. Justice Stevens wrote the dissent which was joined in full by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg. Id.
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access to’ political debates that it sponsors.”237 Justice Stevens, however,
maintained that the majority had underestimated the constitutional importance
of the difference between public and private ownership of broadcast
facilities.238 He argued that “constitutional imperatives” require that access to
political debates held by state-owned entities be governed by “pre-established,
objective criteria.”239 Justice Stevens concluded that the Court of Appeals
decision should have been affirmed because AETC’s decision to exclude
Forbes from the debate “[did] not adhere to well settled constitutional
principles.”240
The dissent highlighted two problems with the majority’s opinion.241 First,
the majority very briefly mentioned the “standardless character” of AETC’s
decision to exclude Forbes from the debate.242 Second, the majority
underestimated the significance of the distinction between state ownership and
private ownership of broadcast facilities.243
The dissent began with a discussion of facts from the record that were
either ignored or not adequately discussed in the majority opinion.
Subsequently, the opinion reviewed parts of broadcast regulation’s history.244
The dissent considered it significant that AETC disregarded the fact that
Forbes’ had considerable political support when he ran for Arkansas elected
positions in the recent past. He received nearly 47% of the statewide vote and
carried fifteen of sixteen counties in the Third Congressional District by
absolute majorities in the Republican nomination for Lieutenant Governor only
two years before the AETC staff decision. The AETC staff ignored this
relevant data when they and made their decision to exclude Forbes from the
debate. In fact, two months after he was excluded, but more than a month
before the debate was held, Forbes was became a ballot-qualified candidate.245
In spite of these facts, AETC concluded that Arkansas voters did not consider
him a serious candidate.246 What AETC obviously did not consider was the
fact that although Forbes may not have been a realistic contender to win the
Third Congressional District seat, “it would have only been necessary for
Forbes, who made a strong showing in the recent Republican primaries, to
divert a handful of votes from the Republican candidate to cause his defeat.”247

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing id., at 1637).
Id. at 1644-45.
Id.
Id. at 1645.
Id. at 1644.
Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1644-45.
Id. at 1644. See supra note 19 for the definition of a “ballot-qualified” candidate.
Id.
Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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As it turned out, the Republican candidate defeated the Democratic candidate
by a margin of only 3 percentage points, 50.22% to 47.20% respectively.
Therefore, the dissent concluded that AETC’s decision to exclude Forbes from
the debate “may have determined the outcome of the election.”248
Next, the dissent briefly examined the consequences of a privately owned
network having made a comparable decision.249 A privately owned network
“would be subject to scrutiny under the Federal Election Campaign Act unless
the network used ‘pre-established objective criteria to determine which
candidates may participate in [the] debate.’”250 The dissent noted that “no such
criteria governed AETC’s refusal to permit Forbes to participate in the
debate.”251 The dissent concluded that the standard AETC used was so flexible
that “the staff had nearly limitless discretion to exclude Forbes form the debate
based on ad hoc justifications.”252
The dissent emphasized that the distinction between public and private
ownership of broadcasting facilities is of great constitutional importance.253
The dissent stated: “AETC is a state agency whose actions ‘are fairly
attributable to the State and subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike the
actions of privately owned broadcast licensees.’”254 The AETC staff members
“were not ordinary journalists: they were employees of the government.”255
Furthermore, “the First Amendment imposes no constraint on the private
networks’ journalistic freedom.”256 The dissent summarized by arguing that
“[b]ecause AETC is owned by the State, deference to its interest in making ad
hoc decisions about the political content of its programs necessarily increases
the risk of government censorship and propaganda in a way that protection of

248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1645 (citing 11 C.FR § 110.13(c)(1997)).
251. Id.
252. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also rebutted the fourth
reason given by AETC to exclude Forbes, that he “apparently had little, if any, financial support”.
The dissent noted that in Arkansas’ Second District, Republican candidate Dennis Scott only
raised $6,000, which is less than Forbes; nevertheless he was invited to participate in the AETC
debate for his district. Id. (quoting id. citing App. 133-134, 175).
253. Id. at 1646.
254. Id. at 1645 (quoting Forbes I, 22 F.3d at 1428).
255. Id. at 1646 (quoting Forbes II, 93 F.3d at 505).
256. Id. (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)).
Justice Burger who was writing for the majority supported this view “by noting that when
Congress confronted the advent of radio in the 1920’s, it ‘was faced with a fundamental choice
between total Government ownership and control of the new medium—the choice of most other
countries—or some other alternative.’” Id. (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys,. Inc. 412 U.S. at 116).
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privately owned broadcasters does not.”257 The dissent believed that the
majority “seriously underestimate[d] the importance of the difference.”258
The dissent then turned its attention to forum analysis.259 The issue in
Forbes, as identified by the dissent, was not whether the AETC debate fit into
a pre-established forum category, as the majority concluded, but rather,
“whether AETC defined the contours of the debate forum with sufficient
specificity to justify the exclusion of a ballot-qualified candidate.”260 The
dissent further refined the issue as follows: “[a] state-owned broadcaster need
not plan, sponsor, and conduct political debates, however, [w]hen it chooses to
do so, the First Amendment imposes important limitations on its control over
access to the debate forum.”261 AETC’s “ad hoc decision” to exclude Forbes
from the debate ‘‘raises precisely the concerns addressed by ‘the many
decisions of this Court over the last 30 years, holding that a law subjecting the
exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license,
without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing
authority, is unconstitutional.’”262 The dissent concluded that “[t]he reasons
that support the need for narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide
licensing decisions apply directly to the wholly subjective access decisions
made by the staff of AETC.”263
Furthermore, the dissent noted that the majority recognized that the debates
sponsored by AETC were “by design a forum for political speech by the
candidates” and that these debates were central in the electoral process.264 The
dissent saw no need to “expound on the public forum doctrine to conclude that
the First Amendment will not tolerate a state agency’s arbitrary exclusion from
257. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1647 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 1646.
259. Id. at 1647.
260. Id.
261. Id. This statement is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court had in the past
recognized that “[o]nce it has opened a limited forum, . . . the State must respect the lawful
boundaries it has itself set.” Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
262. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)).
263. Id. The dissent noted that
Ironically, it is the standardless character of the decision to exclude Forbes that provides
the basis for the Court’s conclusion that the debates were a nonpublic forum rather than a
limited public forum. On page 1642 of its opinion, ante, the Court explains that “[a]
designated public forum is not created when the government allows selective access for
individual speakers rather than general access for a class of speakers.” If, as AETC
claims, it did invite either the entire class of “viable” candidates, or the entire class of
“newsworthy” candidates, under the Court’s reasoning, it created a designated public
forum.
Id. at 1649 n.18.
264. Id. at 1647 (quoting id. at 1640).
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a debate forum based . . . on an expectation that the speaker . . . might hold
unpopular views.”265
The dissent explained that its First Amendment concerns in Forbes are
similar to the concerns of the Supreme Court in Forsyth County v. The
Nationalist Movement.266 In Forsyth County, the Court described “the breadth
of the [parade] administrator’s discretion” in setting an amount of each permit
fee as follows:
There are no articulated standards either in the ordinance or in the county’s
established practice. The administrator is not required to rely on any objective
factors. He need not provide any explanation for his decision, and that
decision is unreviewable. Nothing in the law or its application prevents the
official from encouraging some views and discouraging others through the
arbitrary application of fees. The First Amendment prohibits the vesting of
such unbridled discretion in a government official.267

The dissent conceded that “the discretion of the AETC staff in controlling
access to the 1992 candidate debates was not quite as unbridled as that of the
Forsyth County administrator,” but, “it was surely broad enough to raise the
concerns that controlled [the Supreme Court’s] decision in that case.”268
Further, the dissent emphasized that no written criteria were in place to control
the unlimited discretion of the AETC staff.269 As a result, AETC’s subjective
judgment about a candidate’s “viability” or “newsworthiness” allowed them
“wide latitude either to permit or to exclude a third participant in any
debate.”270
In summarizing its opinion, the dissent emphasized that “[g]iven the
special character of political speech, particularly during campaigns for elected
office, the debate forum implicates constitutional concerns of the highest
order.”271 Finally, the dissent noted that “[r]equiring government employees to
set out objective criteria by which they choose which candidates will benefit
from the significant media exposure that results from state-sponsored political
debates would alleviate some of the risk inherent in allowing government
agencies—rather than private entities—to stage candidate debates.”272

265. Id. The dissent went on to state that “[i]t seems equally clear, however, that the First
Amendment will not tolerate arbitrary definitions of the scope of the forum.” Id.
266. Id.; Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
267. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1647 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 133.
268. Id. at 1648.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1648-49. The dissent further states that “speech concerning public affairs is . . . the
essence of self-government.” Id.
272. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1650 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1446

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:1419

IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. AETC’s exclusion based on “political viability” was a pretext for viewpoint
discrimination.
AETC’s exclusion of Forbes based on his “political viability” was the
pretext under which the station discriminated against Forbes because of his
views. AETC did not apply their political viability test to all ballot-qualified
candidates in the four districts they were holding debates. Only Forbes, the
one independent candidate in all of Arkansas’ districts, was subjected to this
so-called test. Neither Democratic nor Republican candidates in any of the
districts were subjected to this test regardless of their electoral prospects.273 It
is obvious from the other districts’ statistics that AETC invited all Democratic
and Republican candidates without considering their political viability.
For example, the First District of Arkansas is one of the most Democratic
districts in the country, not having sent a Republican Representative to the
House in thirty years.274 Prior to 1992, the election results for this district
show that over the last eight years the democratic candidate has received
between 64.2% and 100% of the general election vote.275 In addition, Terry
Hayes, the Republican candidate for this district in 1992, raised only $38,015
compared to the Democratic candidate’s $439,343, and therefore, was outspent
more than eleven to one.276 Despite these facts, Terry Hayes was invited to
participate in his district’s AETC sponsored debate without any examination of
his political viability.277 In the final tally of the First District, the Democrat,
Blanche Lambert received 69.8% of the vote compared to Hayes 30.2%.278
The Second District of Arkansas had similar statistics. The Democrat, Ray
Thorton received 74.2% of the vote, yet Republican, Dennis Scott, who raised
considerably less campaign funds than Forbes, was invited to participate in the
AETC debate in his district. 279 After examining these statistics, it is obvious
that if either of these candidates were subjected to the same “political viability”
test as Forbes, they would fail.

273. See Amicus Brief for Perot ‘96 at 10; Forbes, 118 U.S. 1633 (1998).
274. See id. at 11-12 (citing CONG. QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 978-1321 (John
L. Moore ed., 3d ed. 1994)).
275. See id. at 11 (citing CONG. QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 1279-1315 (John
L. Moore ed., 3d ed. 1994)). The democratic candidate in the first district received 68.9%, 100%,
100%, 64.8%, 97.2%, 64.2%, 100%, and 64.3% respectively, over the eight years prior to the
AETC debate. Id.
276. See id. (citing Federal Election Comm’n Financial Data for House Gen. Election
Campaigns through Dec. 31, 1992, at 22).
277. See id.
278. See Amicus Brief for Perot ‘96 at 12 (citing Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives,
Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of Nov. 3, 1992, at 5 (1993)).
279. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1645 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In addition to AETC’s discriminatory application of the political viability
test, they never defined the test or its process. The test factors AETC indicated
it used to assess Forbes’ political viability was actually a determination of the
likelihood of his winning the election.280 Therefore, when the AETC staff
decided that Forbes was not a viable candidate, they really meant that he had
little chance of winning the election.281
After one understands what is involved in AETC’s ambiguous political
viability test, it becomes obvious that AETC used this test to unfairly
discriminate against Forbes because of his extreme views.
B. Televised debates are of vital importance to the success of independent
candidates.
From the beginning of our Democratic society “campaigning and voting
were inseparably linked.”282 In the past, political candidates campaigned
directly to their voters through a medium controlled by their political party.283
Today’s candidates depend on media, especially television, “that they do not
control.”284 This gives an enormous amount of power to the media to decide
which candidates deserve coverage and which should be ignored.285
For all candidates, political debates are important to their campaign’s
success, but for independent candidates, they can be crucial for their pursuit of
much needed name recognition. 286 These are precisely the people who will be
most affected by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Forbes. Typically,
independent candidates do not enjoy the same financial support as the
Democratic and Republican candidates, therefore it is harder for them to reach
voters through other means. Ironically, this lower financial status is one of the
factors AETC used to disqualify Forbes from participating in their debate,287
which as the dissent notes “should arguably favor inclusion.”288 Forbes’ lack
of financial support should have cut in favor of his participation, “allowing him
to share a free forum with wealthier candidates,” since he could not afford a
private forum of any sort.289
280. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
281. See Amicus Brief for Perot ‘96 at 21.
282. Amicus Brief for Eugene McCarthy & Larry Agran at 12; Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633
(1998).
283. Ackley, supra note 34, at 500 (citing STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE ET AL., THE MEDIA
GAME: AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE TELEVISION AGE 1 (1993)). “A successful politician was
able to speak directly to his constituents and could often depend upon party-controlled
newspapers to bring the voters his message.” Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.; Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecomm. Comm’n, 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990).
287. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
288. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
289. Id.
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A good demonstration of how important media coverage is for independent
candidate’s success is the campaign of Jesse “The Body” Ventura. Jesse
Ventura, a former professional wrestler won the race for governor of
Minnesota in November 1998. In the beginning, his campaign was considered
a joke to the Democratic and Republican parties, but due to his fame as a
wrestler, he received the media coverage essential to the success of his
campaign.
Jesse Ventura is an excellent example of how hard it is to predict election
results, or “political viability” months before an election. As late as two
months before the November election for governor, pre-election polls indicated
that Jesse Ventura would garner only 10% of the vote.290 However, he won the
election with more than 35% of the vote. This demonstrates how unreliable
AETC’s assessment of Forbes’ “political viability” was in June, five months
before the debate and election.
V. CONCLUSION
This decision potentially could have a broad effect on elections in the
future. Since independent candidates rely on television as their best chance to
reach their voters, and often change election results by stealing a small margin
of the Democratic or Republican votes, the ability to exclude them from
debates will severely affect their success. The conditions set by AETC are
unacceptable if we are to the protect of our most precious political freedoms
under the First Amedment.291 Jamin Raskin292 summed up the majority’s
decision in this case by saying, “[w]e used to think the 1st Amendment
protects the people against the government. This decision protects the
government against the people.”293
LIZABETH M. CONRAN

290. Rochelle Olson, Ex-Wrestler has Choke Hold on Foes in Minn. Campaign, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 1998, at A15.
291. See id. at 11 (citing Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1998)
(stating that the “danger” of “content and viewpoint censorship” is “at its zenith when the
determination of who may speak and who may not is left to the unbridled decision of a
government official”)).
292. The lawyer who represented Ross Perot. Amicus Brief for Perot ‘96 at 1.
293. David G. Savage, Third-Party Candidates Dealt Court Blow Law: Justices Rule that
Public Broadcasters Do Not Have to Provide Equal Access During Debates. Fringe Politicians
Can Be Excluded, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at A16.

The author would like to extend sincere thanks to her father, Joseph Conran, for his advice and
direction. The author would also like to thank Matthew Radefeld for his support and
encouragement throughout the entire process.

